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Abstract 
 
Dependability benchmarks should provide cost-
effective ways to evaluate the behavior of components and 
computer systems in the presence of faults, allowing the 
quantification of dependability attributes or the 
characterization of the systems into well defined 
dependability classes. Beyond existing evaluation 
techniques, a dependability benchmark should represent 
an agreement accepted by the computer industry or/and 
by the user community, and specify the measures, the 
methods, and techniques required to perform 
measurements. This paper discusses the different 
dimensions involved in the dependability benchmarking 
problem and presents basic components required to 
specify dependability benchmarks. Although several 
obstacles still persist and are currently the subject of 
research, the definition of all the dimensions of the 
problem and the agreement of the community on a basic 
set of components that constitute a possible framework for 
dependability benchmarking seem to us a first step in the 
proposal of actual dependability benchmarks. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Our society is increasingly dependent on the correct 
service of computers. Classical features such as raw 
performance and functionality have long driven the 
computer industry to improve their products.  But now, 
dependability and maintainability are becoming seen as 
equally important. Unfortunately, while there are 
relatively straightforward ways to evaluate and compare 
performance and functionality of different systems or 
components, the evaluation of dependability features is 
much more difficult.  
The ascendance of networked information in our 
economy and daily lives has increased awareness of the 
importance of dependability features. In many cases, such 
as in e-commerce systems, computer outages can result in 
a huge loss of money or in an unaffordable loss of prestige 
for companies.  In more personal applications such as 
access to news and weather, dependability problems are 
not as catastrophic, but are nonetheless undesirable.  In 
part because it is futile to attempt to make every computer 
on the Internet work perfectly all the time, system 
designers are increasing emphasis on tradeoffs involving 
both functionality and performance, and in particular 
designing systems to operate in degraded mode or with 
reduced performance in the presence of faults or other 
unavoidable upsets.  Operating in degraded modes is 
usually desirable, but complicates the notion of measuring 
dependability. 
Another clear trend is the use of Commercial Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) components and COTS-based systems in 
application areas requiring high dependability.  Using 
COTS components is seen as desirable to reduce costs and 
speed up time to market.  However, successfully creating 
dependable systems with COTS components that may not 
have been designed to be particularly robust demands 
practical ways to evaluate the dependability and the 
behavior in the presence of faults within these 
components/systems.  
Even the validation of fault handling mechanisms, 
which are just a piece of the dependability picture, is 
traditionally a challenging task. Given the huge 
complexity involved in the design of a computer system 
(hardware, operating system, application software, user 
interface, etc.), there is no single general approach for 
dependability evaluation and validation. Instead, several 
methods have been used, ranging from pure modeling and 
analytical techniques to experimental approaches based on 
fault injection and robustness testing [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].  Most 
of the techniques used for the evaluation of dependability 
and validation of fault handling mechanisms have been 
developed for mission-critical systems and applications or 
for the high-end business-critical area, and therefore might 
make assumptions about design or operating environment 
that affect their suitability for more mainstream computing 
components.   
The goal of dependability benchmarking is to provide 
cost-effective ways to evaluate the behavior of 
components and computer systems in the presence of 
faults, allowing the quantification of dependability 
attributes or the characterization of the systems in well 
defined dependability classes.  Beyond existing 
experimental techniques such as fault injection and 
robustness testing, we feel that dependability benchmarking must provide a uniform, repeatable, 
comparable way of performing this evaluation.  
Dependability benchmarking is subject of a growing 
interest today. Both the research community and the in-
dustry are involved in research projects [6, 7] and groups 
meant to advance the dependability benchmarking area. 
Particularly, the IFIP Working Group 10.4 has created a 
Special Interest Group (SIG) to promote the research, 
practice, adoption, and dissemination of benchmarks for 
computer-related system dependability (the authors of this 
paper are the chair and co-chair of this SIG). The 
activities of the SIG endeavor to attain a clear under-
standing and articulation of the fundamental reasons for 
undependability across multiple disciplines and have thus 
far been focused on the identification of all the funda-
mental issues that must be addressed to create depend-
ability benchmarks. A major task for this group has been 
the establishment of a framework for dependability 
benchmarking. Although this discussion is still ongoing 
within the SIG, this paper presents the authors’ vision on 
this framework and hopes to enrich the discussion by 
soliciting input from a larger diverse community. 
In the next section we present a general view of the 
benchmarking problem, defining many of the dimensions 
of dependability benchmarking. Section 3 presents our 
choices for a framework for dependability benchmarking, 
followed by some concluding remarks in Section 4.  
 
2. Dependability benchmarking dimensions  
 
Benchmarking is an experimental approach to measure 
well-defined features of a system or component according 
to an agreed (i.e., accepted as standard) set of methods 
and procedures. No matter what a benchmark is intended 
to measure (most of the existing benchmarks for computer 
systems are intended for performance measurement) it has 
a set of properties that makes it different from just a 
measuring/evaluating technique.  
First of all, a benchmark represents an agreement that 
must be accepted by the industry or/and by the user 
community. This agreement (i.e., the benchmark) not only 
specifies the features that are relevant to be measured but 
also describes the methods and techniques required to 
perform the measurements.  Additionally, a benchmark 
must be scalable to address systems of different sizes, 
portable to be used across different platforms and 
operating systems, repeatable to provide confidence in the 
measurements, and easy to use.  Most importantly, useful 
benchmarks strive to measure a quality that is important to 
users and vendors, and often must go beyond things that 
simply happen to be convenient to measure.  
Benchmarks are normally targeted to well defined ap-
plication areas or to specific types of systems. This is the 
only practical way to cope with the huge diversity of ap-
plications and systems in the computer industry. However, 
in spite of this inevitable diversity, we hope that all 
dependability benchmarks might share a common 
framework, at least at an abstract level. The framework 
that is proposed in this paper defines all the key compo-
nents of a dependability benchmark and the general ap-
proach of benchmarking for dependability. In this context, 
an actual dependability benchmark is just an instantiation 
of this general framework to a specific application domain 
or to particular kind of computer system. 
The definition of a framework for dependability 
benchmarking requires first of all the identification and 
clear understanding of all the dimensions of the problem. 
Then, defining the framework corresponds to making 
choices in the different dimensions of the problem. To 
simplify this process we divide the problem space in 
dimensions of the problem and components of a 
dependability benchmark.  The distinction between these 
two groups is subtle (in general, all of them could be 
considered as dimensions of the problem, but we find 
making this distinction useful). Basically, we want to 
isolate in the first group the dimensions of the problem 
that affect the dependability benchmarks in terms of 
providing an application area, operating environment, or 
Dimensions and Components  Comments 
Products vs. Processes  Identify the target of the benchmarks: product or the manufacturing process. 
Life cycle phase   Identify the phase in the product life that will be addressed in the benchmark.  
Application area   Identify the application area with the adequate granularity (specificity). 
Operating environment   Typical environment for an application area and the way it affects the benchmark components.  
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User Perspective  Different perspectives for the benchmark measures (e.g., end user, developer). 
Target  Defines the target system expected system behavior in different fault situations. 
Measures  Defines the measures (results) of the benchmark. 
Workload  Defines a working profile that should be representative of an application area. 
Upsetload  Defines the set of upsets, stressful conditions and faults that could affect the system. 
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Procedures and rules  Defines the procedures and the rules to perform the benchmarking. 
Table 1 Table 1 Table 1 Table 1.  .  .  . Dimensions of the problem and possible components of a dependability benchmark. Dimensions of the problem and possible components of a dependability benchmark. Dimensions of the problem and possible components of a dependability benchmark. Dimensions of the problem and possible components of a dependability benchmark. constraint set, but cannot be considered as a direct 
component of a dependability benchmark. For example, 
“Products vs. Processes” is a dimension of the problem 
that can deeply affect the form of the benchmark 
(benchmarks could be quite different if we decided to 
benchmark the product or the manufacturing process to 
produce that product) but cannot be considered a 
component of a benchmark (it is something that we have 
to decide beforehand and include in the process of 
defining a dependability benchmark). Table 1 presents a 
breakdown of the major dimensions and components. 
Dependability benchmarking is an n-dimensional 
problem space. The definition of a possible framework for 
dependability benchmarking corresponds to making 
choices for the different dimensions and/or defining the 
way these choices affect the components of the benchmark 
framework. In this sense different frameworks for the dif-
ferent flavors of dependability benchmarking can co-exist. 
 
3. A dependability benchmarking framework 
 
In this section we propose and discuss a possible 
framework for dependability benchmarking, which 
corresponds to making choices for the different 
dimensions and/or defining the way these choices affect 
the components of a dependability benchmark.  There are 
of course many details that fit within these general 
categories, but we feel that the categories selected serve to 
focus attention on the different general types of factors 
that are relevant for most cases. 
Product vs. process - Although benchmarking the 
process of creating a computer system or component 
could be conceivable (in fact, the ISO 9000 series of 
standards are based on the idea of certifying processes), 
the traditional notion of benchmarking is focused on the 
products.  Products can be benchmarked either directly by 
experimentation or indirectly through the inspection of the 
product features, as stated in the product documentation. 
Our preference concerning this dimension is to benchmark 
actual products via direct observation and 
experimentation. 
Life cycle phase - The main phases of a typical life 
cycle of a computer system or component are the re-
quirements, design, implementation/manufacturing, de-
ployment, and operational phases. A dependability 
benchmark could be specifically targeted to any of these 
phases (e.g., design: evaluate design correctness or design 
robustness to component failure; implementa-
tion/manufacturing: evaluate the impact on dependability 
of manufacturing defects or coding errors, etc.). 
  However, a product-based benchmarking means that 
we are mainly interested in benchmarking dependability 
features at the operational phase of the target system or 
component to the maximum degree possible (which also 
encompasses all the other phases).  The operational phase 
includes normal system operation and maintenance in a 
realistic environment. 
Application area - The application area is clearly a 
key dimension. The division of the application spectrum 
into well-defined application areas is necessary to cope 
with the diversity of systems and applications and to make 
it possible to decide on most of the other dimensions. In 
fact, most of the problem dimensions and dependability 
benchmark components are very dependent on the 
application area. For example, the benchmark measures, 
the working profile, the operational environment, or the 
typical upsets and faults that may affect the systems can 
only be defined if we chose first a specific application 
area. The main difficulty with this dimension is clearly the 
establishment of the right granularity to divide the 
application spectrum. The application areas must be 
general as possible but, at the same time, specific enough 
to allow the definition of all the aspect directly dependent 
on the application area. Obviously, different application 
areas will tend to need different dependability 
benchmarks. 
Operating environment - The operating environment 
is traditionally one of the things that affect system de-
pendability. In fact, many computers faults are induced by 
external sources, and these are intimately related to the 
operating environment. The main problem is to identify a 
way to take into account operating environment features in 
the benchmarking process. This could be particularly 
difficult if we include the human aspects such as the 
actions of operators and users. One possible solution 
could result from the observation that the operating envi-
ronment is very dependent on the application area, as 
mentioned above. Thus, it should be possible to define a 
typical operating environment for a given application area 
which includes the set of upsets and external faults that 
are typical for that application area. In other words, the 
operating environment is dependent on the application 
area and is one of the things to take into account in the 
definition of the upsetload. 
User perspective - A dependability benchmark could 
have different kinds of users (e.g., end user, system 
integrator, developer). These different user perspectives 
affect mainly the type of measures expected from the 
benchmark and the type of target system. Typically, end 
users are interested in general system dependability 
attributes (e.g., unconditional system availability) while a 
system integrator or a developer could be more interested 
in specific measures related to the behavior of the system 
or a component in the presence of faults (e.g., error 
detection coverage or recovery efficiency).  Thus the 
different user perspectives potentially create demands for 
different types of measurements from a benchmark suite. 
So far, we have proposed to focus our framework on 
the benchmarking of products in a direct way as they are used in its operational phase. The framework is applied to 
a specific application area, which works as a key 
dimension in the definition of other dimensions and 
benchmark components. We assume that a typical 
operating environment can be characterized for each 
application (and depends only on the application area) and 
that different user perspectives must be considered in the 
same benchmark. In this context, Figure 1 represents the 
main components of a dependability benchmark. 
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Measures - Dependability benchmarks must include 
direct measures related to the behavior of a computer in 
the presence of upsets (faults and stressful conditions). 
Another form of direct measures is the performance 
measures in both normal conditions (baseline) and in the 
presence of upsets. These measures express the impact of 
upsets in the system performance and functionality and 
allow the measurement of graceful degradation conditions, 
which includes reduced performance modes and/or 
operation in reduced functionality.  
It is worth noting that the need for establishing baseline 
performance measures must not be confused with 
performance benchmarking, as in our case we just need a 
baseline performance (i.e., non optimized beyond normal 
tuning) to evaluate the relative effect of faults and upsets 
on the of performance degradation and on the quality of 
results. 
The direct measures are dependent on the system under 
test and on the application area. This last case is 
particularly true for the measures related to impact of 
upsets in the system performance and functionality. An-
other important thing is that the direct measures represent 
the only system observation points in the proposed 
benchmark. The techniques and instrumentation required 
to collect these measures are still being researched. 
Dependability attributes (e.g., reliability, availability, 
safety) cannot be obtained directly from running the 
experiments specified in a benchmark. If these attributes 
are required (and end users are normally very interested in 
attributes such as availability and reliability) we need 
modeling and some input from field experience, including 
fault distributions and fault probabilities which are very 
hard to estimate (the other parameter in the models ellipse 
in Figure 1).  These are still direct measures, but novel 
ones in the context of benchmarking, because 
performance benchmarks only rely on direct measures 
taken at the time of a specific benchmarking event. 
Although not explored in the framework proposed in 
this paper, another form of benchmark measures is the 
definition of dependability classes. In this approach, 
systems are divided in classes according to dependability 
criteria. The benchmarking process in this case consists of 
identifying an appropriate dependability class for the 
system under test. These measures have been proposed by 
Don Wilson [8] with additional contributions from other 
SIG members, and are making good progress toward a 
formal proposal. 
Workload - The workload represents a typical 
operational profile for the considered application area. 
Widely accept performance benchmarks can provide 
workloads for many application areas and clearly show 
that it is possible to agree on a workload that reasonably 
represents a given application area.  In the case of 
dependability benchmarking the concept of workload 
must be expanded to take into account preventive 
maintenance actions that are conducted as part of routine 
operations for a given application area. For example, in a 
database server events such as system backups or log files 
management are included in the typical profile and should 
be considered in the workload.  
System under test - The system under test can be 
defined in a simplistic way as a system able to run the 
workload. That is, no particular assumptions on the 
system architecture or on the existence of specific 
techniques in the system should be made. All it ought to 
be required is that the system be able to run the workload. 
It should be noted that this reflects the actual situation in 
the field, as systems using different architectures and 
techniques are used to run similar applications.  Of course 
some documentation of the actual system configuration 
employed would be appropriate to enable informed inter-
system comparisons. 
The benchmarking of a specific component in a system 
must be carried out in the same conditions of system 
benchmarking (the component integrated in the system, 
the system running the workload, etc.). The primary 
difference between system and component benchmarking 
is the set of measures produced.  However it might be 
possible to benchmark components using a synthetic 
workload or other workload that is a subset of a complete 
system workload depending on the particular component 
interface. 
Upsetload - The upsetload consist of a set of faults and 
stressful conditions that are intended to emulate all the 
real exceptional situations the system would experience in 
the field. This is clearly dependent on the operating 
environment for the external upsets, which dependents in 
turn on application area. Internal faults (e.g., software 
faults and some hardware faults) are mainly determined by 
the target system implementation. Because few 
assumptions are made on the actual target system structure 
(physical and logical), it is likely that the upsetload must 
Workload 
System 
under test 
Upsetload 
Measurements 
Other parameters 
Models 
Dependability 
Attributes
Direct Dependability 
Benchmark Measuresbe equivalent on a statistical basis for different target 
systems (used in the same application area) rather than 
being literally identical.   
The definition of representative upsetloads is probably 
the most obscure and difficult part of defining a 
dependability benchmark. Even for well-defined 
application areas, the definition of the relative percentages 
of the different classes of upsets and faults is essentially a 
best guess process, much less accounting for potential 
fine-grain interactions among workload and upsetload. 
Additionally, the mechanisms and instrumentation 
required introduce this upsetload in the target system are 
clearly open research issues. 
Procedures and rules - It is well known that any 
benchmark can be "gamed" to produce optimistic results.  
A dependability benchmark would have to include 
standards for conducting measurement and to ensure 
uniform conditions for measurement.  In addition to the 
obvious items such as system configuration disclosures for 
performance metrics, dependability metrics might also 
include requirements or disclosures involving all factors 
that affect dependability. Another important aspect is the 
need of scaling rules to adapt the same benchmark to 
systems of very different sizes (but used in the same 
application area). These scaling rules would define the 
way the system load can be changed. 
The proposed framework consists of basic components 
required to specify a dependability benchmark and the 
way these components are related to the dimensions of the 
benchmarking problem. Although several obstacles still 
persist and are currently subject of research (e.g., 
representativeness of upsetloads, measures, instrumenta-
tions techniques, etc), the definition of all the dimensions 
of the problem and the agreement of the community on the 
basic set of components that can be fault in all de-
pendability benchmarks seem to us as the first step to the 
proposal of actual dependability benchmarks.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Dependability benchmarking is an n-dimensional 
problem space that is currently a subject of intense 
discussion in the dependability community, and 
particularly within the IFIP WG 10.4 Special Interest 
Group on Dependability Benchmarking. Although there is 
a general agreement in the community on the 
identification of the key components of possible 
dependability benchmarks (measures, workload, 
upsetload,…), improved understanding of all the 
dimensions involved in this problem is essential to 
identify all the components of future dependability 
benchmarks and to devise a general approach. Of course 
there are many factors that determine the success or 
failure of a benchmarking effort beyond the technical 
content of the benchmark.  Some of the factors that must 
be accounted for include the cost of conducting a bench-
mark trial, the accessibility of benchmarking materials, 
keeping benchmark implementations fresh in the face of 
evolving technology, and of course political issues as well 
as the ramifications of benchmarking results in different 
marketplaces.  While the importance of these factors must 
not be underestimated, we believe that it is also important 
to advance one or more concrete benchmarking technical 
approaches as a step in addressing a wider range of 
concerns. 
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